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Business Law Reform in the United States:
Thinking Too Small?
BY DOUGLAS C. MICHAEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
D ean Johan Henning presents the South African experience with
business entity reform as one part of a coordinated whole. It
included, for example, government funding for business, tax reforms,
accounting and securities changes.' Henning says that these reforms,
though multi-faceted, had a uniform purpose: to use small business as an
engine to improve the economy and to move "historically and socially dis-
advantaged groups" into the mainstream of the economy and the society.2
These are noble goals and far reaching efforts, and a lot to ask of
business entity reform. But because the South African experience was
nonetheless successful by all counts, it is worth asking whether we could
have-or have had-similar noble motives for business entity reform in the
United States in the past decade. The efforts have proceeded on both state
and federal levels, in response to many different motivations at many
different times. Has the United States, nonetheless, somehow furthered a
noble purpose even in this haphazard, piecemeal fashion? To answer this
question, I will consider the United States' counterparts to Dean Henning's
description of South African initiatives in three principal legal areas:
business entity organization, federal income tax, and financial reporting and
disclosure.
Each area is a fundamental part of small business policy in the United
States.' Further, each of these areas had revolutionary developments in the
Edward T. Breathitt Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law.
Johan J. Henning, Reforming Business Entity Law to Stimulate Economic
Growth Among the Marginalized: The Modern South African Experience, 91 KY.
L.J. 773, 778-79 (2003).
2Id. at 778.
3 See, e.g., Legal Reforms for Small Business-A Symposium, 33 Bus. LAW.
847 (1978) (emphasizing structural, tax, and securities law aspects of small
business legal reform).
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1990s. In substantive business entity law, we saw the creation of the limited
liability company ("LLC") and limited liability partnership ("LLP"), and
reform of corporation law to make it more consonant with the needs of
closely-held businesses. In tax, we saw the development of the "check-the-
box" rules for classification of entities for federal income tax purposes.
Finally, in financial reporting and disclosure law, we saw important
initiatives to simplify the tasks and ease the burdens on small businesses.
In each area, I will review and attempt to reconstruct some of the evident
policies. I conclude that in the attempt to provide alternatives for small
businesses in the United States, there are now too many alternatives. Dean
Henning urges to "think small, first."4 We have, perhaps, been thinking too
small.
11. REFORMS AND RATIONALES
A. Business Entity Law
Substantive business entity law in the United States has developed
recently along parallel tracks. First, reformers of corporation law have
concluded a long effort to make business entity law more useful to closely-
held corporations. Second, we have seen the rise of the limited liability
company ("LLC") and its afterthought, the limited liability partnership
("LLP"). I will review each in turn.
The study of the needs of the small business corporation appears to
have been fairly coordinated and longstanding. In general, reformers long
recognized that changes were needed in corporation law in two broad areas:
management flexibility and dissenting shareholder "exit" rules.5 Although
' Henning, supra note 1, at 778 n.18.
'See Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation Act and
a Proposed Legislative Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817 (1985) (describing shareholder
agreement validation and judicial relief for shareholder oppression); Changes in
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Closely
Held Corporations, 46 BUs. LAW. 297, 297-98 (1990) [hereinafter Closely Held
Corporations Amendments] (proposing new §§ 7.32 and 14.34 of the Model
Business Corporation Act to deal with shareholder agreements and buyouts);
William S. Hochstetter & Mark D. Svejda, Statutory Needs of Close Corpora-
tions-An Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible
General Corporation Law?, 10 J. CORP. L. 849, 893-980 (1985) [hereinafter
Empirical Study] (discussing main issues: providing management flexibility,
loosening formalities, protecting shareholders, and resolving dissension and
deadlock); Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the
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an exhaustive 1985 survey indicated practitioners preferred a separate
elective close corporation statute,6 there were many practical drawbacks to
the use of such a statute.7 Adopted instead were three provisions of the
Model Business Corporation Act intended to reach the same result but not
requiring special choices.' This was considered by many to be better, in
part, because small businesses could take advantage of these provisions
without special legal assistance. 9
State corporation law, as indicated by the Model Business Corporation
Act, is probably a good model of adjustment of a statute intended largely
for public corporations"0 to the needs of small businesses. Some commenta-
tors have indicated that courts have done better than special statutes in this
regard." We remain, however, without a uniform statutory approach in this
area. Many states retain separate statutes available for close corporations. 2
Others have adopted the new approaches of the Model Act. 3 Others have
still different provisions. 4 Although pioneering efforts have been made, life
as a small corporation remains difficult without a good lawyer.
United States, 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 663, 672-77 (1989) (listing goals of close
corporation legislation as addressing the "internal governance problem" and
"minority shareholder oppression").
6 See Empirical Study, supra note 5, at 10 19-26.
7 See Closely Held Corporations Amendments, supra note 5, at 297 (citing
Bradley, supra note 5).
8id.
9 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 5, at 843 ("Failure to use these statutes in many
cases is traceable to a lack of proper understanding of the statute and the
prevalence of a sort of puritanical conservatism in the practice of law.").
Uo See Karjala, supra note 5, at 664-65; John M. Cunningham, Making Life
Easier for Mom & Pop: Fine-Tuning the Law for Close Corporations, Bus. LAW
TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 56.
" See generally Karjala, supra note 5 (presenting the history of close corpor-
ation statutes and judicial interpretations of the same); Empirical Study, supra note
5, at 856-58 (analyzing the use of "judicial exceptions"). Karijala admits his view
is probably a minority one. See Karijala, supra note 5, at 702.
12 See 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACTANN. CC-71 to CC-72 (Supp. 1998-99) (listing
eighteen states with separate close corporation statutes, five of which have since
adopted MBCA § 7.32); Cunningham, supra note 10, at 60 (Delaware and
California); Karjala, supra note 5, at 680-88 (North Carolina, Delaware, and 16
states following the Delaware approach).
13 See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. at 7-249 to 7-251 (Supp. 2000-2002)
(listing sixteen states having adopted MBCA § 7.32 and five others with similar
provisions); 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. at 14-155 (Supp. 2000-02) (listing
twenty-one states having adopted MBCA § 14.34).
14 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-010(3) (allowing for more flexible
rules for corporations with fifty or fewer shareholders).
2002-2003]
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Modification of partnership entities, by contrast, began as a quest for
"technical corrections" in the Uniform Partnership Act, and was swept up
in the tax-fueled rise of the LLC and LLP in the 1990s. It is a story well
told by Dean Vestal in his contribution to this symposium. 5 In our decade
of "great change and little accomplishment," 6 he notes, we have proceeded
with no underlying unifying theory, no goals in sight, and no account taken
of social costs and benefits. 7 It is anything but clear that the interests of the
small business were considered.
Yet, in all this activity, surely we have the right answer in there
somewhere. Surely we should have flexible rules that restrict choice only
in cases of demonstrated need to do so.' 8 This we have done, with a
contractarian approach to both partnerships 9 and corporations.20 At the
same time, we should provide default rules for those who do not, or do not
want to, make their own bargains.2' This, too, we have done. And surely,
we should protect the small business, to make sure that an efficient regime
"5 Allan W. Vestal, Business Law Reform in South Africa: The Right Path, the
Right Reason, 91 KY. L.J. 829 (2003).
16 Id. at 834 (quoting Allan W. Vestal, "Drawing Near the Fastness? '--The
Failed United States Experiment in Unincorporated Business Entity Reform, 26 J.
CORP. L. 1019, 1019 (2001)).17 d. at 833-36.
'8 See Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 453, 459 (1997) ("If the parties affected by the provision do not
want it, why does the state insist upon it? And if the parties, freely contracting,
would prefer the state-mandated provision, then why should the state bother to
mandate it?"); Uriel Procaccia, Crafting a Corporate Code From Scratch, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 629, 630-31 (1996).
"9 See Vestal, supra note 15, at 834.
20 See 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.32, official comment (1997 Supp.)
(noting that the section "affords participants in closely-held corporations greater
contractual freedom to tailor the rules of their enterprise"); Cunningham, supra
note 10, at 58 (characterizing MBCA § 7.32 as "a statutory trump card that, in
designing their corporate structure, close corporation shareholders may use to
override otherwise applicable [statutes]"); Loewenstein, supra note 18, at 453-54
(noting dominance of contractarian philosophy in modem state corporation laws).
21 See Loewenstein, supra note 18, at 453-57 (arguing for a set of rules for
protection of shareholders); see also J. Mark Meinhardt, Note, Investor Beware:
Protection of Minority Stakeholder Interests in Closely Held Limited-Liability
Business Organizations: Delaware Law and its Adherents, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 288,
309-10 (2001) (concluding that instead of contractual freedom with no rules, we
should provide default rules for exit protection and fiduciary duties and allow the
sophisticated investors contract around them).
[VOL. 91
BUSINESS LAW REFORM IN THE U.S.
is available at low cost. This, however, we have not done very well. We
have lost sight of the small entrepreneur, the one Dean Henning identified
as needing support and guidance.22 Indeed, as one reviewer notes:
Most businesses in this country are unincorporated sole proprietorships,
businesses owned and operated by one person. Unincorporated sole
proprietorships are often found in underdeveloped, poorer communities,
including inner cities and rural areas that are challenged by limited capital,
poor access to insurance coverage, limited training, and unsophisticated
legal and technical skills.23
In our pluralistic attempt to provide the right answer somewhere, we have
forms with a bewildering variety but no purposeful distinctions.
B. Tax Law
Dean Henning observes that "in order to enhance the prosperity of
small enterprises, governments should ensure that these enterprises are not
over-taxed." '24 Small business federal income tax policy in the United
States, however, has often run on a different track. While tax relief for
small business is occasionally a stated objective of tax policy, it more often
involves tax simplification and a continuing debate over "entity" versus
"aggregate" form.25
Broad tax relief for small businesses is occasionally a focus of federal
income tax policy. When Congress enacted Subchapter S in 1958, it was
intended as tax relief for the type of business that Dean Henning has in
mind: "the comer grocery store [or] pharmacy.... The intent was to allow
smaller businesses to incorporate but be taxed like partnerships, allowing
passthrough of start-up losses and only one level of taxation once the
22 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
23 Mitchell F. Crusto, Extending the Veil to Solo Entrepreneurs: A Limited
Liability Sole Proprietorship Act (LLSP), 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 381, 383-84
(internal citations omitted).
24 Henning, supra note 1, at 779.
25 See, e.g., Harry J. Haynsworth, The Needfor a Unified Small Business Struc-
ture, 33 Bus. LAW. 849, 861-62 (1978) (beginning with observation that small
business needs "a supportive tax system that provides adequate incentives for
investment," but turning quickly to a more detailed discussion of "whether any
difference in the treatment of the various forms of businesses is justified, at least
as far as small businesses are concerned").
2002-2003]
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business became profitable."26 There are, in addition, many other varied
federal income tax benefits or credits aimed at "small" businesses,
variously defined."
Far more common, however, is concern of tax authorities and policy
analysts over tax simplification. This is evident in the adoption of the so-
called "check-the-box" regulations28 in 1997; these regulations intended to
make the "pass through" or one-level income tax more easily available to
small businesses by allowing them to select their federal income tax
treatment or classification.29 In proposing the regulations, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") noted that taxpayers would be able, without new
regulations, to obtain partnership tax classification for any organization of
whatever form which is "virtually indistinguishable from a corporation."3
However, "[t]o accomplish this,.., taxpayers and the IRS must expend
considerable resources on classification issues. . . . Meanwhile, small
business organizations may lack the resources and expertise to achieve the
tax classification they want under the current classification regulations."31
Although the new regulations were intended to simplify the classifica-
tion decision, complexity continues to be the dominant feature.
Although in theory, similarly situated businesses have the same opportu-
nity to be treated in the same tax-advantageous manner under current law,
the practical reality is probably to the contrary, due to disparities in the
quality of advice the businesses receive. By permitting such disparate
choices without any apparent underlying conceptual foundation, current
law has simply provided a tax benefit for the well-advised and a trap for
the ill-advised. There is no particular policy reason why the taxation of
26 Jerald David August, Benefits and Burdens of Subchapter S in a Check-the-
Box World, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 287, 322-23 (1999).
27 George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX
REv. 141, 199 & n. 168 (1999) (citing twenty-five different provisions).
28 For a history of the proposal and adoption of these rules, see CARTER G.
BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND
BUSINESS LAW at 2-4 (1999) (noting that these proposals were "[u]nofficially, but
ubiquitously, labeled the check-the-box regulations").
29 Simplification ofEntity Classification Rules, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Notice of Public Hearing, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, at 21,989-90 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Entity Classification Proposed Rules]. Final regulations are at Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3 (2003). Id. at 21,997.30 Entity Classification Proposed Rules, supra note 29, at 21,990.
31 Id.
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private business firms should result in the minimization of tax liabilities
for only the well-advised.32
Tax simplification is recognized as a necessary counterpart to serious
reform, but the major policy question is whether this simplification should
move toward the "entity" theory of businesses, with a separate tax (as with
a Subchapter C corporation), or toward the "aggregate" theory, 33 with pass-
through taxation to the owners of the business (as with a partnership or
Subchapter S corporation). The aggregate theory seems on the ascendancy;
indeed, the check-the-box regulations have been recognized as extensions
of this theory.34 The aggregate theory meets tax objectives of equity and
efficiency,35 but remains intractably difficult to implement.36 Indeed, some
analysts have suggested that the aggregate theory, while conceptually
better, has too many disadvantages, including lack of familiarity to
businesses and taxpayers.37
In sum, it appears that United States tax policy lurches here and there
toward tax relief for small businesses. However, more effort seems to have
32 Yin, supra note 27, at 149-50; accord August, supra note 26, at 331 (noting
that the limits on the use of Subchapter S aggregate tax treatment for corporations
results "in greater transactional and compliance costs and rewards the more
sophisticated business owners over the less sophisticated"). Yin reports similar
conclusions in his capacity as Reporter in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT, TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, REPORTER'S STUDY
40-47 (1999) [hereinafter FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT].
33 This is sometimes also called the "conduit" theory, recognizing that the entity
should only be a "conduit" of tax items to its owners.
34 See Joel Rabinovitz & Eric M. Zolt, Tax Nothings, 75 TAXES: THE TAX
MAGAZINE 869, 883 (1997).
31 See Philip F. Postlewaite, I Come to Bury Subchapter K, Not to Praise It, 54
TAX LAW. 451, 464 (2001) (concluding that aggregate approach meets equity and
efficiency goals); David I. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in
the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1627, 1672 (1999) (noting that "under plausible
assumptions, the check-the-box regulations are efficient"); Yin, supra note 27, at
153.
36 See Yin, supra note 27, at 201 (noting "the complexity of subchapter K
[partnership taxation rules], the lack of significant IRS auditing of firms subject to
those rules, and the general feeling that large parts of subchapter K are misapplied
even by very knowledgeable practitioners"); id. at 172-247 (designing a simplified
method of conduit taxation); accord FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note
32, at 109 (asserting that "[s]omething very fundamental must be awry in the basic
structure of the rules for the law to have evolved into this unhappy state.").
37 See generally Postlewaite, supra note 35.
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been placed on simplification of choices or compliance under existing
disparate taxation schemes. Indeed, one question about the check-the-box
regulations is whether allowing taxpayers to choose the applicable tax rules
will result in unanticipated abuse.3" Whether the simplification effort will
ultimately result in simpler federal income tax laws for small business
remains questionable.
C. Financial Reporting and Disclosure Law
The revolution of the 1990s in financial reporting and disclosure
provides, at least initially, a refreshing contrast to the muddled efforts in
other areas. From the outset, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") made clear the end and aim of its proposed reforms of disclosure
requirements applicable to small businesses. Small businesses were, said
the SEC, "the cornerstone of the U.S. economy," and needed access to
capital "without undue regulatory complexity and cost."39 Despite that
ringing endorsement, facilitating commerce "has emerged as a goal equally
important to that of investor protection,"4 ° and the goals of full disclosure
and small business relief remain at cross purposes in many instances."
The SEC adopted major reporting reforms for small businesses, both
in initial registration of securities for public trading and in registration of
securities in the secondary market.42 These efforts were an attempt to
lighten the burden of compliance with requirements placed on small
businesses by the federal securities laws.43 Measured by this standard, the
efforts have been only partly successful due in large part to the lack of
coordination by the state securities regulators." Although Congress
38 See Rabinovitz & Zolt, supra note 34, at 885-86.
39 S.E.C., Small Business Initiatives, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 57 Fed.
Reg. 9768, 9768-69 (1992).
40 Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed
Formula That Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
199, 206 (1994).
41 Id.
42For a concise summary of the SEC's Small Business Initiatives, see Note, The
Impact of the 1992 Small Business Initiatives, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 511, 513-15
(1995).
43 Id. at 513. "Over the years, federal and state securities regulation has added
significantly to the plight of small businesses by making it unnecessarily difficult
for them to raise capital." Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Impact of NSMIA on
Small Issuers, 53 BUS. LAW. 575, 579 (1998).
"Note, supra note 42, at 524-25.
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attempted to mitigate the overlap of federal and state securities regulation
in the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA"),
45
this effort was at best incomplete. In the most important respects, NSMIA
refused to preempt state regulation and left small business issuers in the
same situation as before.46
With disclosure policy it appears that there is not so much a lack of a
clear vision as there is a lack of consensus from federal and state regulators.
While the United States has tried to create a "small business" version of
disclosure rules, as with substantive business entity and federal income tax
law, much work is still needed.
III. EVALUATION
Dean Henning urged policy makers to "think small, first,"47 an
exhortation endorsed by Dean Vestal.48 Perhaps in the United States we
have taken that principle to an undesirable extreme. There is no consensus
about substantive business organization models,49 federal income tax
policy,5" or disclosure policy." Rather, we provide a multitude of small
41 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
4 Campbell, supra note 43, at 582-83.
47 Henning, supra note 1, at 778 n. 18.
48 Vestal, supra note 15, at 836.
49 See id. at 834.
It goes without saying that there is absolutely no consensus that limited
liability should be available without taxation, that current patterns and
elements of tort liability are inappropriate, or that the taxation of corpora-
tions is unjustified. Nor is there consensus on the foundational question of
whether business entity statutes for partnership-like firms should be based
on a contractual model or on a tort model.
50 See Yin, supra note 27, at 149.
Thus, each set of [tax] rules ... was designed to apply to a particular
business organization form with specific characteristics. Yet, adoption of
the check-the-box regulations reflects a policy determination generally to
disregard business organization form and characteristics for income tax
purposes. Given that, it is difficult to understand why firms are nevertheless
allowed a choice regarding how they are taxed and why they are given the
particular choices that they are.
"' See Wade, supra note 40, at 208 ("[E]xemptions from [disclosure require-
ments] reflect a willingness, in certain instances, to assist issuers in capital
formation at a tolerable cost to investors.... When an issuer goes beyond the
boundaries drawn under the [Securities Act] exemptions, the goal of information
2002-2003]
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solutions. The current laws provide any desired governance structure, profit
sharing arrangement, or exit rule, whether in a partnership, LLC, orclosely-
held corporation. It is simply a drafting challenge.52 The United States
provides pass-through tax treatment in a partnership, LLC, or closely-held
corporation, under at least two different tax regimes.53 There are limited
disclosure obligations under federal law, but left in place are substantial
obligations under various state laws.
What is needed, perhaps, is to think a little larger. There are various
proposals for unified and simplified small business organization laws,54 tax
laws,55 and disclosure laws.56 Imagine such a structure: easy to understand,
easy to use, and ready to make a small business accessible to every
entrepreneur. This, indeed, could empower the marginalized.57 In the
United States, we may have the right answer in there somewhere. We could
take Dean Henning's challenge to heart and take bold policy steps with our
small business laws. True, this is a lot to ask of business law reform.
However, it was not too much in South Africa, and it should not be too
much here.
dissemination through disclosure overcomes the goal of facilitating commerce.").
52 See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 14 (2000).
[T]he factors often suggested as the basis for choosing between corpora-
tions and other business forms are, for the most part, things which owners
can obtain regardless of which form they use. Contracting can dictate
governance, exit rules and even to a great extent limited liability, despite the
form chosen. Perhaps choice of business form is irrelevant.
" Pass-through treatment is generally the rule for partnerships under Subchapter
K and corporations electing similar treatment under Subchapter S. A third option,
using a traditional (Subchapter C) corporation normally subject to a separate tax,
is to "zero out" the corporation through deductible payments to its owner(s). See
GEVURTZ, supra note 52, at 18 (adding the observation that "[n]eedless to say,
.there are limits to this approach").
54 See Robert R. Keatinge, Universal Business Organization Legislation: Will
it Happen? Why and When?, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 29, 68 (1998) (noting that the
move toward a universal form is already occurring); see generally Haynsworth,
supra note 25 (proposing a unified structure across all components).
55 See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note 32, at 125-272 (proposal for
a unified small business simplified taxation system).
56 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 43, at 585-87 (advocating complete federal
preemption of state disclosure laws).
" Recall the "marginalized" business described by Crusto. See supra text
accompanying note 23.
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